Monday, September 19, 2016

Repairing a dysfunctional partnership (client confidential)


We were asked to step in when relationships between a County Council and Clinical Commissioning Groups broke down. Trust was low, meetings were fractious and unproductive and progress in health and social care integration had halted.

What did we do

Sue Goss began a painstaking process of meeting each of the leaders individually, listening carefully to their feelings as well as their account of what was going wrong. After hearing from everyone, she brought a leadership group together and shared a ‘problem tree’ – a visual representation of all the emotions, concerns, problems and issues that had been aired – and gained agreement from everyone to try and change things. A carefully structured awayday followed, in which leaders worked in pairs to listen to each other and build an understanding of the different perceptions and assumptions that had grown up. These were then shared in small groups and finally in the whole leadership group.


Participants discovered that although they were often in rooms together, the pace and format of meetings and the size of agendas left little time to think and less time for meaningful conversations. The formal technical language of strategy and plans made it hard to express worries, and no-one felt their concerns were heard or responded to. What was striking was that this was a dysfunctional system with no “villains” – everyone was trying to do their best.

By creating space for the right conversations to take place, and the difficult work that had so far been avoided to be faced – it was possible to slowly build trust. Relationships slowly improved over a number of months – and while tensions didn’t go away, it was easier for them to be named, and dealt with. Leaders began to pick up the phone or go for coffee together, rather than sending prickly emails. This is work in progress.

Monday, September 19, 2016

Southend Vision for 2030 – Southend on Sea Borough Council


Following an initial phase of community and stakeholder engagement carried out by Southend-on-Sea Borough Council, the OPM Group was commissioned by the council to deliver a community engagement programme to support the Borough and Council in setting its community vision. The aim of the project was to facilitate a series of conversations to explore and develop the collective aspirations of a different groups within the community for the Borough, as well as identifying how these groups will work together to achieve it against a backdrop of reducing resources.

What did we do

In order to ensure that conversations were grounded in a detailed understanding and appreciation of the challenges and opportunities facing the borough, the initial stage of the project centred on in-depth research and scoping. This comprised community and stakeholder mapping, a rapid document review of recent public engagement and service monitoring data for the borough and a series of telephone scoping interviews.

The central element of our approach focused on a participation and engagement, harnessing the energy and enthusiasm of communities to ensure buy-in to the vision being developed. We carried out a series of workshops involving a wide cross-section of Southend’s communities, from businesses to grass-roots local organisations to residents more widely.


These events comprised a smaller, targeted focus-group style discussions with specific groups as well as larger open-invitation workshops and enable local people to contribute thoughts and ideas to the ‘narrative’ being developed so that it reflected a genuine community-wide, collaborative discussion.

Monday, August 15, 2016

Unlocking Local Capacity – four years on

Let’s start with the scene-setting – the introduction you hear at every local government conference you’ve been to for the last five years. Money is getting tighter and tighter. Demand is growing – particularly in areas like adult social care. Five years from now – short of some miraculous windfall – councils won’t be able to deliver many of the services they do at present, at least in the way they’re used to, and maybe not at all.

Next, you hear something about citizens and communities. Wherever we look for solutions – localism, behaviour change, channel shift, technology, better partnerships and so on – sooner or later relationships with communities crops up as crucial to making at least some of this work. That could mean getting better at co-designing services with citizens, as opposed to calling them out to dull consultation events every few years. At the other end of the spectrum, it could mean local organisations – or even just groups of residents – taking on a service or an aspect of a service that otherwise would no longer be sustained. Both of these activities are happening already, of course, in different places and according to different challenges.

This much we know – and have known it, talked about it and predicted work around it for over the last five years. But what we know less well is how far everyone’s got on in actually doing something about it. And that is what I want to find out.

So, if you work in a local authority, what is your organisation doing to build, nurture or unlock the capacity in your communities? How have you been trying to genuinely, deeply involve local people in redesigning services, or in helping them to change their lives/neighbourhoods for the better in ways that might not involve traditional council services at all? We asked these questions to 30 local authorities in 2011-12 when we researched our publication ‘Unlocking Local Capacity: why active citizens need active councils’. We made the case that empowering citizens didn’t just mean councils ‘getting out of the way’, but that on the contrary, it demanded that councils play a very direct, active role – just working in a different way than many had been used to.

Four years on, we want to revisit those same questions and take stock of what councils are doing or planning now. For some, the constant pressure on budgets and ever-increasing demand will have put innovation around community involvement firmly on the back-burner. For others, those same challenges have been a spur to action, driven by the ambition of certain members, senior managers, officers at the coalface or other local partners to try new things. Are we seeing real, tangible results, or is it all still a work in progress?

Over the next few months I’ll be holding a series of telephone interviews with strategy and policy leads in local authorities to hear about their successes, frustrations, ambitions and plans to build local capacity and move into new, dynamic and impactful collaborations with community partners. I would love to hear from people delivering different things across a range of local authorities across England to build up a picture of what’s happening and what works. So if you’d to add to the debate, please do get in touch.

Thursday, June 23, 2016

Not waving, but drowning… in data? Managing data and Social Impact Bonds

This is the third blog in the series that summarises key points in a speech I delivered at the 2016 Social Investing and Corporate Social Responsibility Forum, held at Meiji University in Tokyo. Here, I reflect on the following issue:

The importance of data

SIBs are outcomes-focussed. In the first blog of this series, I wrote about outcome metrics, and I think it’s sufficiently appreciated that outcome measurement is critical to the successful of SIBs. It is also widely reported that the ‘data burden’ of SIBs can be considerable. Our first interim evaluation report of the Essex County Council SIB, for example, pointed out that “information and reporting requirements of the SIB have felt onerous for all partners”.

While outcomes are vital, SIBs require more than outcome data to work. If stakeholders are not careful, they may find themselves in a position of expending disproportionate amounts of time and resources in collecting, analysing and reporting data.

We should not, however, simply accept this at face value as a ‘fact’ of SIBs. If we are to take the outcomes-focussed principle to its logical conclusion, then we must surely also be clear about the desired outcomes for data collection and its use. Starting with this helps streamline data collection and use, ensuring that we know why we are collecting certain types of data, and how we are going to use them.

As SIBs involve multiple players, each must develop clarity about data for their specific needs. In addition, the different players need to work together to minimise duplication and ensure that information is shared and that there are systems in place to support collaborative interpretation and scrutiny.

Shared approaches to data categorisation and collection

Different though SIB stakeholders may be, their approaches to data categorisation and collection is surprisingly similar.

When categorising data there are particular ‘headings’ that data relate to. Data can be categorised as regular performance management data, process data, impact data, and cost-benefit data. This points to the fact that delivering a SIB effectively requires parties to monitor ongoing operational matters; constantly assess and review the implementation of the intervention(s); ascertain the degree of which implementation may be leading to the desired outcomes; and assurance that transactions represent good value for money.

Indeed, different SIB players often collect and/or require similar, if not identical, data. This immediately alerts us to the fact that the various players need to work collaboratively to ensure they do not duplicate efforts; share data where relevant; and streamline processes to reduce the overall burden of collecting, analysing and reporting data. Not doing so can lead to unintended additional costs for all parties, as our second Essex SIB interim evaluation report has shown.

Different stakeholders use data differently

While data required can be identical across the various players, the use of the same data can be quite different.

Outcome payers scrutinise data as part of due diligence, which can be heightened in the case of SIBs. They need to show that they have undergone robust scrutiny of the data to justify paying out to investors. They also look at data from the point of view of assessing performance against the original business case for the SIB, and to see how the SIB way of doing things compare with more conventional ways of commissioning services.

Service providers look at the data in terms of understanding the effectiveness of implementation and the efficacy of the intervention. This may be particularly true if they are not delivering a strongly evidence-based intervention, and/or if their intervention is flexible and adaptive. In addition, service providers will wish to be clear about the true cost of delivering a service under a SIB model and how it compares with other ways of ‘selling’ services. They may be interested in ‘going to market’ more widely through a SIB model, and such information is therefore crucial in helping to price appropriately and competitively. Needless to say, most if not all service providers have a strong focus on outcomes for their service users.

Social investors, from our experience, tend to look at data with an eye on what can be improved. They are always looking at how they may redirect resources, adjust inputs and the approach to give it the best chance of success. After all, payment is linked to success. They also look at the data to assess return on investment, and how it compares with other forms of investment, and also how it compares with their investments in other SIBs.

Evaluators, of course, look at the bigger picture in terms of what the impact of the SIB has been and whether it adds values, over and above the operational concerns of individual SIB players. This is where I would encourage evaluators of SIBs to place emphasis on understanding the impact of the SIB, as opposed to the impact of the intervention per se. There is a real gap in our collective knowledge base in terms of how and whether SIBs add value; and whether particular models of SIBs may be more or less effective in different contexts, policy areas, or target groups.


Just as SIBs are focussed on outcomes, the exercise of collecting and analysing data for a SIB should equally be outcomes-focussed. Many commentators have noted that SIBs can be overly complex, and data requirement is often part of this complexity. Equally, commentators have pointed out that in order for SIBs to flourish and to achieve the desired degree of spread and scale, it is vital for us to work together to find ways of simplifying and streamlining core SIB components so as to reduce transaction costs.

There will always be a degree of bespoke tailoring required in specific contexts, but there are core generic components that may be simplified or made consistent. The information collection and reporting requirement seems to be one of these ‘design features’ of SIBs, using the terminology from Bridges Ventures, that may be amenable to this, thereby contributing towards reducing the transaction costs of SIBs.

Thursday, June 16, 2016

Social impact bonds in Japan – it’s not always about saving money

In the previous blog in this series, I shared some key messages from a recent speech I delivered at the 2016 Social Investing and Corporate Social Responsibility Forum, held at Meiji University in Tokyo. In this blog, I summarise some of the thinking shared with Japanese colleagues on a second topic they had asked me to touch on:

Can you structure outcome metrics in a way that is not motivated directly by budgetary savings but by social wellbeing?

Level of outcomes

We can look at outcomes at the individual level, the group level and the system level. At the individual level, outcomes are obviously about achieving and improving individual wellbeing. At the group level, we may aim for improving social wellbeing. At the system level, there can be policy or political priorities that focus on social wellbeing. There can also be economic benefits that are being aimed for, and also budgetary ‘cashable’ savings.

Meeting the priorities for outcomes at one level may not always lead to (or support) achievement of priorities at another level. Outcomes for individuals, for instance, may not always lead to savings for the system. An intervention aimed at reducing the social isolation of a socially excluded group may uncover previously unmet needs, resulting in these people being put in touch with other services. While this is a good thing, it does mean there is a direct service use cost, at least in the immediate short term, that was not previously there.

Wellbeing, rather than savings, as a driver

If we are to take an approach that prioritises the achievement of individual/social wellbeing as opposed to the achievement of budgetary savings, there are different ways for structuring outcome metrics in support of this goal.

(a) Taking a wider definition of outcomes and accounting for their value: This recognises that there are different perspectives of the value of the same outcome. For example, when we talk about the ‘cost of crime’, members of the public do not really think of the cost of policing, the cost of incarceration, etc. Instead, they are likely to think about the economic, social and emotional harm inflicted on the victim and communities experiencing crime. A wellbeing perspective will therefore need to take these into account, over and above the system costs.

(b) Acknowledging public ‘willingness to pay’: The public can value things even when the financial implications of those things may not be clear. This ‘willingness to pay’ is underpinned by what we as a society think of as ‘right’ and ‘of value’. It can be influenced by cultural, ethical or moral norms. For example, there can be a strong moral case for supporting war veterans.

Public ‘willingness to pay’ is subjective, contextual, and can change. For example, prior to the UK Government announcing its Comprehensive Spending Review (CSR) at the end of 2015, there was widespread expectation that the government would cut policing budgets significantly. In fact, the government had hinted this will happen. The CSR took everyone by surprise when it was announced that policing budgets would be protected. Why had this happened? In a nutshell, the global terrorism threat had become increasingly significant. Public expectations around policing and security have gone up the political agenda, and it would have been untenable politically to cut policing budgets in such a context.

How may this look like in terms of structuring outcomes

First, there can be situations where the primary outcome metric that triggers payment is savings related, but there are also a range of other wellbeing outcomes being monitored and tracked. For example, in the Essex County Council SIB, the primary outcome metric that triggers payment is ‘care days avoided’. There are a range of secondary outcomes, such as strength of family functioning, emotional wellbeing, educational outcomes, etc. Data on all of these are analysed and discussed by the Programme Board on a regular basis. The seriousness to which the various players consider outcomes holistically is demonstrated by the fact that the social investors have committed to re-contacting the families who have received Multi-Systemic Therapy some time after the intervention has ended to check whether a range of outcomes are sustained over and above the duration for formal outcomes monitoring required by the SIB.

Second, there can be outcome payers who are prepared to pay for outcomes even when they are not linked directly to savings. These outcomes may be paid for as stand-alone outcomes. One of the outcome metrics that triggers payment in the Lisbon Junior Code Academy SIB, for example, is ‘logical thinking’. Logical thinking, obviously, is not something that leads directly to budgetary savings, but is a life skill that will serve an individual well throughout his and her life and can operate in very different situations.

Third, rather than to pay for stand-alone wellbeing outcomes, these may be blended in with other types of outcomes that may be more savings-related. The New South Wales, Australia, Benevolent Society Social Benefit Bond shows how this may be done. Payment is triggered by the Performance Percentage. Performance Percentage is a weighted average of three separate measures. This provides a model for how wellbeing outcomes can be woven in with others to create a composite outcome that triggers payment.


As many of the initial SIBs are underpinned by a savings logic, it is easy to think that SIBs can only be structured with this objective in mind. The outcomes focus of SIBs should challenge us to be clear about ‘outcomes for whom?’ Shifting the gaze away from system-level outcomes onto outcomes for others requires us to think of different ways to identify and structure outcome metrics to support the achievement of individual and social wellbeing.

Thursday, June 9, 2016

Japan in Spring: the budding potential for Social Impact Bonds

I was flattered to have been invited back to Japan in April to speak at the 2016 Social Investing and Corporate Social Responsibility Forum, held at Meiji University in Tokyo. Japanese colleagues specifically asked me to touch on the following issues:

  1. How do the various Social Impact Bond (SIB) players identify and structure outcome metrics?
  2. Can you structure outcome metrics in a way that is not motivated directly by budgetary savings but by social wellbeing?
  3. What data do the various SIB players need to collect, and how do they analyse and use the information?
  4. What are some lessons that OPM have learned from evaluating SIBs?

This is the first, in a series of blogs, summarising some of my key messages.


How do the various SIB players identify and structure outcome metrics?

There are a number of factors to consider when identifying metrics for SIB-funded programmes. However, this is an art not a science and it should support – not obscure – the achievement of meaningful outcomes.

The ‘3 Ms’

I work to three key principles called the ‘3 Ms’, namely, metrics should be:


a) While SIBs are focused on outcomes, for contracting purposes, the duration of SIBs has to work for the outcomes payers, social investors and service providers. Hence, metrics are usually some form of intermediate or proxy indicators. There should be a compelling rationale to believe that if these intermediate/proxy outcomes are generated, then it is plausible that the longer term desired outcomes are likely to be achieved.

b) Metrics should be easily interpretable. What does it mean if an indicator goes up, stays the same, or comes down? Take ‘reporting of crime’ as an example; if crime reporting goes up, is it because there is more crime (which is bad) or is it because people are getting better at reporting crime (which is good)?


a) Can the outcome be measured consistently and robustly? Where it is not already collected routinely, what are the resource implications for collecting the data, and are there tools and processes for collecting the data well.

b) Do we have the systems in place to support good measurement?


As SIBs are based on the ability to pay for stated outcomes, there needs to be some mechanism for pricing those outcomes. It is common to find outcomes being priced based on some projected savings resulting from those outcomes being achieved, but outcome pricing does not always have to stem from budgetary savings.

Roles in identifying and structuring outcome metrics

Social investors, outcome payers, service providers and intermediaries are all very diverse and have different motivations, so it can be hard to generalise. Crudely speaking, their roles and significance of their roles can vary depending on the type of SIB.

Outside of the UK, individually-negotiated SIBs are most common. This type of SIB means that the outcome payers often work very closely with service providers and sometimes with the help of external intermediaries to help them define and structure outcome metrics.

In the UK, we similarly have individually-negotiated SIBs (for example, the Essex SIB that OPM has been evaluating). However, UK is unique because we have many SIBs developed through an Impact Bond Fund model (e.g. the Innovation Fund, Fair Chance Fund, Youth Engagement Fund). Under this model, government departments (as outcomes payers) spent a lot of time analysing data and came up with what is known as a ‘rate card’ that specifies the different outcomes that the government is interested in, how the outcomes should be measured, and the maximum price that the government will pay for each outcome.

There are now SIBs that are developed by service providers and sometimes intermediaries. In these cases, the service provider or intermediary led the development of the outcome metrics. For service providers, it is usually because they have a long history of delivering a specific intervention and have been measuring its effectiveness in a particular way.

Structuring outcome metrics and payment

Crudely speaking, this is done at the individual level or at the group level. At the individual level, outcomes are specified for the individual participant/beneficiary. It may be one outcome per participant, or could be a series of outcomes for that person. This is the approach used in the Impact Bond Fund SIBs. In the first round of the Innovation Fund, the rate card issued by the UK Department for Work and Pensions specified that one of the desired outcomes was ‘improved behaviour at school’. This outcome was to be measured by ‘letter from teacher’. The achievement of this outcome for the pupil triggers a payment of up to £800.

In comparison a group-level approach can be structured in two ways. First, you focus solely at the intervention group and define the number or the percentage within that group that needs to demonstrate the outcome. This is the approach used in Germany’s SIB which specified that at least 20 individuals out of the group of 100+ must experience the outcome for payment to be triggered.

Alternatively, you can compare the intervention group against a control group. In these scenarios, there are often thresholds set for outcome levels. For example, the Peterborough SIB structured its outcome metrics in a way that supported two different payment triggers. The first is when an intervention cohort demonstrates at least 10% reduction in reoffending compared with the control group. If this condition is not met, a second way for triggering payment is if all three intended cohorts have an average reduction in reoffending of at least 7.5%.


It strikes me that while the principles underpinning outcome metric selection are clear, the act of identifying and structuring them in support of SIBs is as much an art as it is a science. There is no single approach that works in all cases. I think it is important that we do not get lost in the technicalities and forget about what is really important. Instead, we must always keep a clear eye on outcomes and make sure that we identify and structure metrics in a way that supports meaningful achievement of those outcomes.


Thursday, May 26, 2016

Our work with the Royal College of Nursing to showcase the costs and benefits of nurse-led innovation

With funding from the Burdett Trust for Nursing, we have been working in partnership with the Royal College of Nursing (RCN) to build nursing capability in economic assessment and to help nurses demonstrate the value of nurse-led innovation in practice. In April we held a breakfast event jointly with the RCN and Hospice UK, Demonstrating the value of nurse-led innovations in End of Life Care, which shines a light on nurses working in hospice and care home settings. The full video of the event – including presentations from Dr. Chih Hoong Sin (OPM), Dr. Ann McMahon (RCN) and Antonia Bunnin (Hospice UK), not to mention case studies from practitioners themselves – can be accessed via here.

For any questions regarding this partnership or our economic evaluation work, please contact Chih Hoong on

Tuesday, May 17, 2016

Evaluation of the Reducing Social Isolation and Loneliness Grant Programme

Social isolation and loneliness in older people is a widespread issue that has gained much attention in recent years. We know that being isolated and lonely can impact on a person’s quality of life and lead to more intensive use of health and social care services.  

In Manchester the three Clinical Commissioning Groups provided grant funding targeted to reduce social isolation and loneliness amongst Manchester residents aged 50+. Grants were awarded to voluntary sector organisations to deliver 27 projects across the city. The Programme ran from September 2014 until March 2016 and was managed by Manchester Community Central (Macc).

OPM was commissioned to evaluate the Grant Programme. The evaluation sought to demonstrate outcomes and provide evidence around ‘what works and why’.

This presentation was delivered at the final Programme celebration event attended by representatives from the CCGs, other North West CCGs, Manchester City Council, Macc, local research organisations, plus VCS leads and volunteers from across the city. It presents the headline findings from the evaluation and showcases two projects in depth. Our final evaluation report will be available in the coming months.

Click here to download the presentation slides.

Tuesday, May 17, 2016

Evaluation of the Reducing Social Isolation and Loneliness Grant Programme

Social isolation and loneliness in older people is a widespread issue that has gained much attention in recent years. We know that being isolated and lonely can impact on a person’s quality of life and lead to more intensive use of health and social care services.

In Manchester the three Clinical Commissioning Groups provided grant funding targeted to reduce social isolation and loneliness amongst Manchester residents aged 50+. Grants were awarded to voluntary sector organisations to deliver 27 projects across the city. The Programme ran from September 2014 until March 2016 and was managed by Manchester Community Central (Macc).

OPM was commissioned to evaluated the Grant Programme. The evaluation sought to demonstrate outcomes and provide evidence around ‘what works and why’.

This presentation was delivered at the final Programme celebration event attended by representatives from the CCGs, other North West CCGs, Manchester City Council, Macc, local research organisations, plus VCS leads and volunteers from across the city. It presents the headline findings from the evaluation and showcases two projects in depth. Our final evaluation report will be available in the coming months.

Wednesday, October 21, 2015

Whither Social Impact Bonds?

When the Peterborough Social Impact Bond (SIB) was launched in 2010, SIBs were heralded as the future of funding social change. This £5million SIB was designed to reduce reoffending among short-sentence male prisoners through an innovative model of levering private investment in social outcomes. In April 2014, however, the third and final cohort of the SIB was cancelled; leading to much hand-wringing by concerned onlookers. This ‘shut down risk’ has caused a number of interested parties to express concern that the development of SIBs may be stunted by Government ‘meddling’. Others were more despondent and claimed that the SIB “dream” may be over.

However, at around the same time as the cancellation of the final Peterborough SIB cohort, the Cabinet Office launched a £30million package to back SIBs to help disadvantaged young people into education, work or training. The number of SIBs in the UK continues to grow, and currently totals 31; more than the rest of the world combined. My trip to Japan earlier this year and a second visit from the Japanese delegation in September to learn from the UK SIB experience and to explore the future of SIBs indicates continued international interest. A variant of the Impact Bond model: the Development Impact Bond, has just been launched in Rajasthan, India; aimed at improving the retention and attainment of girls in schools.

A recent expert roundtable convened by the UK Cabinet Office and HM Treasury focusing on the future of SIBs again signals the current Conservative Government’s intention to ‘scale up’ SIBs, signaled in their Manifesto published before the Election. SIBs can therefore be thought of as still being in a nascent stage of development. It is a concept that is still being pushed in ways that may not have been envisaged when the Peterborough SIB was first designed.

I realised, from my involvement in the Commissioning Academy over the past 15 months or so, that while awareness of SIBs has risen over time; most are still woefully unaware of how SIBs have been evolving and the implications that may arise. Indeed, most people’s understanding of SIBs is based on quite outdated information.

Proliferation and transformation

Although they got off to a slow start, SIBs have now entered a phase marked by proliferation. This is not merely a numbers game. Moving beyond criminal justice (as in the case of Peterborough), SIBs have now spread across an ever-growing number of social issues including children and family support, employment, homelessness, health, and more. There are brave and creative ones emerging, tackling issues such as social isolation, using social prescribing to support holistic wellbeing, and more.

While many SIBs are used to back proven evidence-based interventions, there are others motivated by a commitment to try new ways of doing things by backing relatively ‘untested’ interventions. There are also examples of SIBs being used to back proven interventions in ways that varied from the evidence base behind those interventions; for example by applying an intervention on a different target group, in a different setting, etc. The appetite for innovation seems alive and well.

Different SIB structures have also emerged. The Bank of America Merrill Lynch and Bridges Ventures have typologised them as ‘direct’, ‘intermediated’, and ‘managed’ SIBs. These different and ever-evolving structures are important in supporting different commissioner, provider, and investor motivations; for example through accommodating different appetites for risk. This could bring a wider variety of actors into the market, in turn opening up further possibilities.

A further development that has attracted significant attention has been a response to the high development costs of the “first wave” of UK SIBs which has been perceived by many to be a major stumbling block. For example, the Essex SIB took 23 months to develop and cost Essex County Council around £300,000. Innovative responses from the market have led to new variants of SIBs that are provider-led, or have been packaged by intermediaries, in ways that reduced transaction costs for commissioners by creating models for easy ‘spot purchasing’.


It is endlessly fascinating to observe how different groups, different sectors and different countries have taken the idea of a SIB and have run with it; molding this malleable idea into seemingly limitless incarnations. There is no single model of SIB that is appropriate in every instance. Indeed, SIBs themselves may not be suitable in some situations. Instead, it encourages us to continue innovating and pushing the idea to its limits. I would simply like to end with a reminder never to forget the ‘social impact’ part of Social Impact Bonds. At their best, SIBs contain a wealth of possibilities for generating meaningful social impact for some of the most vulnerable people in our societies. Let us rise to that challenge.

Dr Chih Hoong Sin, OPM Director for Business Development